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Abstract
abspara0010 Insurance and the law are interconnected. Legislation, court decisions, and regulations impact and influence the meaning of
private and social insurance arrangements in society. While the law shapes and influences what insurance means in society,
insurance also exerts a regulatory force over its subjects and acts as a form of governance beyond the state. Drawing from
sociolegal scholars who study the gap between the law on the books and the law in action, this article explains the basic forms
and functions of insurance in society and explores insurance’s intertwined relationship with the law.
p0015 As Justice Black of the United States Supreme Court wrote in
1945: “Perhaps no modern commercial enterprise directly
affects so many persons in all walks of life as does the insurance
business. Insurance touches the home, the family, and the
occupation or the business of almost every person in the
United States” (United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Association, 1945).
p0020 The law shapes and influences what insurance means, while
the law is simultaneously influenced by insurance. Courts
interpret the meaning of insurance policies, statutes establish
what social insurance and other public sector insurance
arrangements are permitted, and insurance regulations attempt
to enforce state insurance laws, promulgate rules and regula-
tions, and conduct hearings to resolve disputed matters per-
taining to insurance. Private insurance arrangements in
particular depend on a well-defined and robust contract law
and a regulated market. While the law influences insurance,
insurance also exerts a regulatory force over its subjects and acts
as a form of governance beyond the state. Moreover, the pres-
ence of liability insurance often shapes how tort lawsuits are
structured. Insurance is also an ideological construct that
influences the relationship between law and regulation, such
that much of society is governed through risk, both within the
boundaries of insurance but even beyond insurance. Although
ideas about what is insurable and what should be insurable
vary over time and location, it is clear that risk and insurance
impact so many aspects of society.
p0025 Drawing from sociolegal scholars who study the gap
between the law on the books and the law in action, this article
explains the basic forms and functions of insurance in society
and explores the intertwined relationship of insurance and
the law.
s0005 What Is Insurance?
p0030 Although there is not one formal definition of what insurance
is (Kimball, 1992: 1; Abraham, 2013), insurance is generally
thought of as a formal mechanism for sharing costs for
misfortune or injurious experiences. Insurance deals with
‘risk’, that is, the chance that something can happen (often
something negative). In the insurance field, risk is often
conceptualized in two ways: (1) a person, property, or
enterprise that is insured; and (2) the possibility that
something can harm that person, property, or enterprise.
Insurance essentially protects the persons or things insured
against the possibility of harm.
p0035Contemporary insurance arrangements are designed around
a formal and organized scheme for the distribution of an
economic loss over a large number of persons subject to the risk
of a particular loss, with a goal of replacing the uncertain risk of
loss with a predictable cost. The loss is often distributed by
transferring the risk to an insurer (risk transfer). The loss is
distributed in advance, often by charging a fixed premium or by
charging an assessment after the event, or by some combina-
tion. For the insuring agreement to function well, the incidence
of the loss should generally be reasonably predictable for some
class of persons from which the participants will be drawn (risk
pool), and therefore for any sufficiently large number of such
participants taken at random (Abraham, 1986).
p0040Because of the variation in the size and complexity of
insurance, insurance can be characterized in multiple ways: (1)
by line, which divides insurance into property and casualty
insurance (fire, ocean, title, errors and omissions, and various
forms of liability insurance) and personal insurance (life,
accidental death or dismemberment, disability, and health
insurance); (2) by interests protected, which distinguishes first-
party insurance (the policyholder insures his or her own
interest in a person’s life or in property) and third-party
insurance (liability insurance, which pays proceeds to a third
party to whom an insured becomes liable); (3) by method of
marketing, which distinguishes between group versus indi-
vidual policies, and among insurance entities based on the
methods used to sell policies (agents, brokers, etc.); and (4) by
insurer organization, which acknowledges the various struc-
tures through which insurance entities operate (e.g., stock
companies, mutual companies, reciprocal exchanges, Lloyd’s
associations, and various hospital and medical organizations)
(Jerry and Richmond, 2012).
p0045In general, legal scholars tend to divide the insurance law
field into two subareas. One focuses on the law concerning the
relationship between private insurance organizations and
their insureds. This is most often developed from judicially
articulated doctrines that regulate the relationship between
an insurer and policyholder and is considered a part of con-
tract law (although tort law and agency law principles and
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some statutes and administrative regulations are sometimes
important to this framework). The other realm of insurance law
is largely a series of statutes enacted by state legislatures and
administrative regulations developed by agencies that exist in
most states. This is considered a part of the law of regulated
industries (e.g., Baker, 2010; Jerry and Richmond, 2012;
Cousy, 1999).
s0010 Insurance as Contract
p0050 Historically, insurance law has been considered derivative
of contract law (Baker, 2008). Contemporary insurance
institutions were derived from two distinct roots: (1) insurance
as a mutual benefit protecting a fraternal group or (2)
insurance as a commercial enterprise promoting trade and
investment. Under either scenario, “insurance was a voluntary
undertaking whose obligations were determined almost
exclusively according to the rules governing the field of law
that came to be known as the law of contracts” (Baker, 2008: 29).
p0055 By the mid-nineteenth century, courts in Europe and the
United States recognized that insurance contracts were not
traditional contracts, that is, voluntary agreements with terms
that are negotiated between two parties with equal bargaining
power. Rather, insurance policies are largely contracts of
adhesion. Rarely do insurance companies and policyholders
have equal bargaining power. Insurance companies typically
use standard-form contacts with terms that are not subject to
negotiation. Standard-form insurance policy provisions are
often vague and drafted at a level of generality that leads to
differing expectations about the scope of coverage within the
policy. Moreover, most individuals do not have much knowl-
edge about precisely what they are purchasing, especially
because they often purchase insurance through intermediaries
such as agents (who often offer minimal explanation of what
the insurance policy provisions mean). On the other hand,
insurance companies are often repeat players, wealthy, and the
more sophisticated economic entity when dealing with
a prospective insured. There is also not much variation in the
market; with some exceptions (Schwarcz, 2011), insurance
companies offer similar contract terms to consumers with
similar profiles and needs. Moreover, insurance companies
not only have more information, but better information
concerning the meaning and value of the insurance policy
than the person seeking to purchase insurance. Due to its
gatekeeping function (see ‘Insurance as Gatekeeper’ later
in the article), insurance is often not voluntary but
a prerequisite to obtaining other privileges in society.
p0060 Although government regulation of insurance began in the
United States during the latter half of the nineteenth century,
the relationship between insurers and policyholders has
remained largely within the domain of contract law. Courts
and state regulations attempt to provide some protection to
insureds, albeit with varying degrees of success. In particular,
state regulations in the United States require premarket
approval of some of the terms of insurance policies. Courts use
the contra proferentem principle to try to protect insureds. Courts
invoking this principle hold that ambiguities in a contract
should be construed against the drafter. This interpretive
principle is often used to supersede rather than interpret
insurance policy language. Although regulatory agencies and
courts can provide a formal check on the asymmetric rela-
tionship and require companies to reform the content of the
standard form insurance policy, insurance companies often
retain the contractual ability to modify insurance policy
provisions going forward (to make policy provisions less
ambiguous). By exercising this ability, companies can avoid
judicial and regulatory scrutiny. Thus, contract law has and will
continue to define the major aspects of the relationship
between insurers and policyholders.
s0015Insurance as Regulation
p0065Insurance is also a form of regulation that affects many aspects
of our lives. The state engages in the regulation of its citizenry
by setting eligibility requirements and benefit levels for social
insurance. Insurance companies establish the underwriting
criteria, standards, and charge premiums. These mechanisms
allow insurance companies to control who can or cannot
obtain insurance. Through insurance policy terms and pricing,
insurance companies also establish norms of conduct. Private
insurance policies for life, health, and property often take the
form of private legislation or regulation through exclusions
and conditions. Thus, insurance is able to regulate even acts
within the home or business, where traditionally individuals
have been free from interference (O’Malley, 1991; Baker, 2010;
Ben-Shahar and Logue, 2012). The following sections highlight
two specific ways that insurance regulates law and society: (1)
insurance as gatekeeper and (2) insurance as a specific form
of tort regulation.
s0020Insurance as Gatekeeper
p0070Insurance serves a gatekeeping function in society because it is
a prerequisite to other activity. Generally a person cannot
register an automobile without automobile insurance, obtain
a commercial business loan without business-owners’ insur-
ance, bid on a government contract without a surety bond,
obtain practice privileges at hospitals without medical
malpractice insurance, and sign a commercial lease without
commercial property and liability insurance (Baker, 2010).
p0075Home ownership in the United States quite clearly illus-
trates the gatekeeping function insurance plays. Home owner-
ship is traditionally considered one of the fundamental features
of the American economy. Thus, the availability of mortgages
at a reasonable and affordable rate is often regarded as an
important economic indicator. However, homeowners’ insur-
ance plays an important role in the availability of mortgages,
because one cannot take out a mortgage without homeowners’
insurance. In particular, obtaining homeowners’ insurance is
mandatory for standard mortgages and homeowners’ insurers
often use their own underwriting concerns that are indepen-
dent from the screening procedures implemented by the lender
(Squires, 1997).
s0025Liability Insurance as Financier for the Tort System
p0080Liability insurance acts as a form of tort regulation and in doing
so, finances the civil litigation system. Tort law in action is often
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shaped by the absence or presence of liability insurance. Over
the past century, tort law has continually sought available
sources of recovery and often creates and expands the liability of
individuals and businesses that are likely to be covered by or
have access to liability insurance (Abraham, 2008). As tort law
expands, so does liability insurance. For example, medical
liability insurance grew with medical liability and became so
intertwined with it that occasional medical liability insurance
crises are widely interpreted as medical liability crises (Baker,
2005a). Product liability doctrine has been facilitated by
product liability insurance. Insurance companies responded
by creating new forms of liability insurance to address the
new liabilities when existing insurance was not available.
Employment liability insurance rose as employment liability
grew in the late nineteenth century. Moreover, state workers’
compensation statutes enacted in the early twentieth century
addressed the rising number of work-related accidents and the
fact that the litigation system was unpredictable, expensive, fil-
led with delays, and often led to small recoveries for people with
work-related injuries. Workers’ compensation laws allowed
individuals suffering work-related injuries to receive compen-
sation relatively quickly and without needing to obtain a lawyer
and establish tort liability (Friedman and Ladinsky, 1967;
Talesh, 2012). Even the US government took steps after the
terrorist attack of 11 September 2001 to design a first-party
liability insurance scheme, to compensate victims’ families
who otherwise would have had to use the tort system to seek
relief. The compensation fund established by British Petroleum
in response to the oil spill that occurred in the Gulf of Mexico in
2010 provides a more recent example of how insurance-based
principles are used to preempt tort liability.
p0085 Because of consumer debt and the ability of bankruptcy
courts to discharge civil liabilities, liability insurance is the
primary asset on which plaintiffs can count when seeking to
collect tort judgments. Without liability insurance, many
underserved individuals who were innocently injured as the
result of a tort by another person would not be compensated
through civil litigation. Liability insurance in action means that
when an injured victim brings a tort claim against a tortfeasor,
it is the liability insurer that often defends the claim and, if
necessary, pays the claim (Gross and Syverud, 1996). The
presence of liability insurance consequently shapes how
plaintiffs and defense lawyers litigate cases (Yeazell, 2001).
A plaintiff lawyer’s decision to represent an injured victim in
a tort case is predicated not merely on proving the elements
of a tort but on the defendant’s ability to pay (Baker, 2005b).
Liability insurance determines who can be sued, for how
much, and for what wrongs. For individuals bringing tort-
based lawsuits, “liability insurance is a de facto element of
tort law, [and a] de facto cap on tort damages” (Baker,
2005b: 13). Even large corporations with significant assets
often have liability insurance, but this relationship does not
necessarily make litigation more efficient; large corporations
involved in tort lawsuits often spend a significant amount of
time convincing their own insurance companies to pay
(Baker and Griffith, 2010).
p0090 In one of the early but influential studies of the gap between
the law on the books and the law in action, Ross’s (1970) study
of automobile insurance adjustors in the late 1960s revealed
how liability insurance led insurance claims administrators to
focus on interpreting and implementing tort law by primarily
managing aggregate costs rather than determining the
individual fault of defendants:
p0165Adjustment of insurance claims compromises the legal mandate for
individualized treatment with the need of a bureaucratic system for
efficient processing of cases. This compromise can be observed at
many points in the processes of investigation and evaluation.
Investigation is vastly simplified, for instance, by presumptions as to
liability based on the physical facts of the accident. Accidents are
thus seldom individualized to an insurance adjuster or a claims
attorney. Rather, they are rear-enders, red-light cases, stop sign cases,
and the like and the placement of an accident into one of these
categories ordinarily satisfies the requirements for investigation of
liability..
p0170A large-scale society proceeds by routinizing and simplifying
inherently complex and difficult procedures. This is how the work of
the world is done. This is the law, as it is experienced by its clients
rather than by its philosophers (Ross, 1970: 135).
p0095Thus, under Ross’s study, liability insurance is a bureau-
cratic claim processing mechanism that renders large amounts
of tort law into a simple, manageable set of compensation rules
and procedures. Although Ross focused on automobile claims,
others have demonstrated how tort claiming is highly con-
nected to liability insurance in a number of other tort subfields
(Abraham, 2008; Abraham and Liebman, 1993; Baker, 2005a;
Vidmar et al., 2005; Baker and Griffith, 2010).
p0100Other forms of insurance also regulate tort law in action.
When a statutory insurance scheme is in place, tort liability is
often limited. Such statutory schemes have multiple effects: (1)
they sometimes create a bar on certain types of tort claims; (2)
they alter the manner in which tort claims are resolved by
causing plaintiffs’ lawyers to frame their claim in a manner that
avoids being precluded from recovery; and (3) they lower the
potential level of total recovery for a tort by making it more
difficult to sue in tort when health, disability, or property
insurance are covering an injury. Conversely, the existence of
first-party insurance can sometimes (depending on the juris-
diction’s collateral source rules) lead to a potentially higher tort
recovery because collecting from the first-party insurance carrier
shortly after the injury occurs can decrease the need or desire to
settle early in the case, which allows litigants to pursue a more
aggressive litigation strategy.
p0105In some respects, legal insurance in Europe (and to a lesser
extent in the United States) is an attempt to finance the litiga-
tion process even further by prospectively offering coverage for
the risk and cost of a lawsuit. Legal insurance, legal cost
insurance, or simply legal protection insurance is a form of
voluntary private insurance that covers the costs of legal
proceedings. With some variation, legal insurance in Europe
covers all costs related to bringing or defending a claim, though
not the claim itself. Although legal insurance covers claims
arising out of contracts, social insurance, some family matters,
and defense of criminal and misdemeanor cases (among
others), “insurance for motoring and traffic accidents has been
the main factor behind the expansion [of legal insurance]”
(Raiser, 2001: 8639). Although less present in the United
States, legal insurance is often reflected in two ways: (1)
prepaid legal services offered by trade unions and
professional groups to their members and (2) group legal
Insurance and the Law 3
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services plans, which cover workers in a particular branch and
are financed primarily by the employers. These legal service
plans allow workers and families greater access to legal
counseling and, if necessary, legal support in court. Although
neither the European nor the American markets are
dominated by legal insurance, the existence of these
insurance schemes reflects an awareness that litigation is
often financed by insurance and provides a market for people
to shift legal risk away from themselves.
s0030 Insurance as Governance
p0110 A series of empirical studies in the past two decades has also
helped us understand how insurance institutions, forms,
technologies, and visions (Ewald, 1991) act as a form of
governance beyond the state (Ericson et al., 2003; Ericson
and Doyle, 2004). Beginning with Heimer’s (1985) inquiry
into how insurers manage moral hazard in property and
fidelity insurance relationships and continuing with Ericson
et al.’s (2003) comprehensive research on the Canadian
insurance industry, scholars have begun to understand how
insurance is an institutional force with effects on individuals,
organizations, and institutions inside and outside the
insurance industry.
p0115 Ericson and his colleagues explain that insurance governs
society through ‘nine-interconnected dimensions’ (Ericson et al.,
2003). To begin, insurance simultaneously produces knowledge
of risk, creates a scheme from which risks can be made
objectively calculable, and develops a risk pool. In particular,
these three dimensions of insurance classify everything into
degrees of chance of harm and make everything calculable and
consequently subject to commodification. Through actuarial
techniques, concrete facts about objective risks are converted
into probabilities and ultimately assigned a cost so that prices
can be established. Actuarialism creates a risk pool, that is,
a population that has a stake in the identified risks and the
specific harms they entail. The risk pool transforms the
population into a collective that seeks to minimize loss while
also compensating those who suffer a loss. Turning to the
fourth dimension, insurance does not protect against the
particular event that causes harm to a member of the risk
pool, but instead protects against a loss of capital that might
result from that event. Their fifth and sixth dimensions
identify the hybrid nature of insurance as both managerial
and legal. Insurance manages risks in the population by using
oversight, surveillance, and auditing while also making its risk
pool subject to contract and ultimately adjudication. But
insurance also assists the law in assigning liability to the party
most capable of distributing the loss through insurance.
Addressing the final three dimensions, these scholars explain
how insurance’s cultural, technological, and political functions
impact and influence society in several important ways: “in
providing a futures market in security, insurance offers
a cultural framework for conceptions of time, destiny,
providence, responsibility, economic utility, and justice.” They
also observe that “insurance is a social technology of justice. It
bridges individual and social responsibility through
distributive justice (collective sharing of loss) and restorative
justice (financial indemnification).” For that reason, they
contend, “insurance is . political, combining aspects of
collective well-being and individual liberty in a state of
perpetual tension” (Ericson et al., 2003: 6).
p0120Scholars adopting an insurance-as-governance framework
emphasize the way in which private insurers and governments
exercise similar power in society and behave in a similar
manner. In particular, the private insurance industry has many
of the same goals as the state, including seeking forms of social
security and solidarity by pooling risks. The private insurance
industry provides technologies and social arrangements for
allocating risk across pools of risk takers and provides for
a sharing of the risks of misfortune through financial
compensation of loss. It also attempts to establish preventative
security arrangements that try to minimize harm and loss to its
citizens. Thus, the private insurance industry governs through
its powers to transfer and distribute risk, and it engages and
involves the state only when necessary. The private insurance
industry also uses many of the same methods as the state to
achieve its goals such as surveillance, underwriting (sophisti-
cated information systems for selecting risks), and claims
(compensating loss). It also uses a substantial amount of
private policing in the form of technologies, investigators, and
inspectors to address fraud and achieve loss reduction and
preventative security. Similar to the state, the private insurance
industry is subject to many social, economic, and political
forces (such as changes to the environment, economic global-
ization, terrorism, property and violent crime, and advances in
medicine and health). The private insurance industry partners
with the state to regulate insurance practices.
p0125Consistent with the work of Ericson and his colleagues,
there has been an effort in the past 20 years toward both
theorizing and empirically exploring how the private insur-
ance industry plays an active role in constructing the meaning
of risk and responsibility in different segments of society.
Notable governance-as-insurance studies include studying the
role of property insurers in governing security in the home
(O’Malley, 1991), highlighting the governance role of
insurance companies in the motion picture industry in the
United States (Hubbart, 1996–97), analyzing the rise of risk
management approaches toward campus drinking (Simon,
1994), and examining the tort-settlement factoring industry
in the United States (Scales, 2002). More recently, scholars are
beginning to think about governance in the health insurance
context. Hunter (2008) argues for using ‘risk-centered
governance’ as the model for health law and policy. Hunter
highlights how the debate in the United States over universal
access to health insurance often links itself to the debate
over the rise of actuarial medicine. She argues that
the political attractiveness of ‘risk’ is subject to multiple
interpretations and appropriations, including some that
could mobilize pressure to use conceptions of risk in a more
equitable manner (Hunter, 2008; see also Stone, 2002).
Hoffman (2010) examined the Massachusetts mandatory
health insurance experiment and identified how the
fragmentation of health insurance risk pools that results
from actuarial risk rating limits the ability of private
insurance markets to carry out the social goal of
redistributing health across society.
p0130In sum, the private insurance industry acts as a system of
governance through various forms of collaboration with state
4 Insurance and the Law
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governments: “sharing similar goals of security and solidarity
through the pooling of risks; using similar techniques for
governing at a distance; and collaborating in insurance
regimes” (Ericson et al., 2003: 65). Insurance institutions
are not just pooling and transferring risk, but instead
actively shaping the world within which they operate.
As these examples highlight, under a governance
conception, insurance does not fit well within a public–
private dichotomy. The relationship between insurers and
policyholders falls somewhere in between the relationship
between a public government and its citizens and a private
relationship between two parties to a contract. However,
private insurers are not agents of government; they are not
subject to the rules, policies, and procedures that limit
government discretion. Moreover, they are not required to
afford policyholders constitutional protections (such as due
process or equal protection) (Abraham, 2010). As the private
insurance industry’s governance role continues to grow,
scholars going forward may want to consider standards for
regulating the behavior of private insurers beyond those
contained in administrative regulations, civil law doctrines,
and contract law doctrines.
s0035 Insurance as a Tool for Increasing or Decreasing
Social Stratification
p0135 Insurance in action often serves a social stratification function.
Insurance law scholar Tom Baker argues that the “social strat-
ification function of insurance is a more generalized way of
thinking about the dynamic that makes insurance companies
gatekeepers” (Baker, 2008: 10). As the prior sections highlight,
the relationship between insurance and law in society is often
mediated by insurance institutions, namely, insurance
companies. Those individuals who cannot obtain insurance
from insurance companies occupy a different social position
than those who are able to obtain insurance. Moreover,
people who have to pay more for insurance have fewer
resources to spend on other things. To be clear, insurance
companies are not the sole cause of such inequality.
However, insurance companies do play an important role
and in doing so, simultaneously construct and reflect the
broader social conditions that lead to social stratification. In
the context of first-party insurance, many life, health, and
disability insurance companies have traditionally refused to
provide coverage to people who have been treated for mental
illness (Baker, 2002). Some insurance companies that are
guided by an overzealous desire to insure ‘good’ risks
sometimes ‘cream-skim’ and insure only ‘good’ risks and
therefore decrease the likelihood of paying out on claims.
This has the undesirable effect (from the standpoint of
society) of leaving those most in need of insurance without
being able to obtain coverage and increases the gap between
‘haves’ and ‘have-nots.’
p0140 Conversely, insurance laws and regulatory schemes some-
times allow insurance to ameliorate social stratification and
consequently serve the public interest (Talesh, 2012). In
addition to liability insurance financing the civil litigation
system, state laws require people to purchase automobile
insurance and allow employers to opt into state-created
workers’ compensation insurance schemes. In doing so,
insurance laws provide injured persons with insurance mech-
anisms through which to seek relief. Health insurance laws
such as Medicaid and Medicare in the United States assist the
poor and the elderly (and other groups) by increasing access to
care to those whomay not otherwise be able to purchase health
insurance. Universal or socialized health care programs in
Canada and some European countries (and more recently, the
Affordable Care Act in the United States) also attempt to reduce
social stratification. Though not perfect, insurance regulation,
in addition to court decisions, attempts to ensure that insur-
ance companies follow through on their promises, remain
solvent, and avoid unfair business practices. Without insurance
laws and regulations, policyholders could not possibly trust
insurers to pay claims or remain solvent. As a system of risk
spreading, transfer, and distribution, insurance can sometimes
promote the public good and often allows individuals to seek
compensation without needing to use a lawyer. In this way,
insurance law acts in the public interest because it provides
a collection mechanism for injured persons seeking compen-
sation and relief for injuries (Talesh, 2012).
s0040Governing through Risk beyond Insurance
p0145Conceptions of insurance impact many social and legal rela-
tionships in society beyond the traditional insurance context.
Insurance technologies and visions are used to govern risk
outside of insurance institutions and risks that cannot or
should not be governed by insurance. Baker and Simon refer to
this concept as ‘governing through risk,’ the idea of using
formal considerations about risk to direct organizational
strategy and resources outside of (beyond) the traditional
insurance context (Baker and Simon, 2002). There are
numerous examples of governing through risk that draw on
insurance technologies and visions but occur outside the
traditional insurance context. To name a few, community
policing models target high-risk areas (Ericson and Haggerty,
1997), social service agencies focus on at-risk children, envi-
ronmental engineers conduct risk assessments of hazardous
waste sites and other sources of environmental concern
(Graham and Weiner, 1995), judges and policymakers debate
tort and accident law in terms of allocation and spreading of
risk (Calabresi, 1970), and financial analysts develop and
structure portfolios based on a risk-reward ratio (Bernstein,
1992, 1996). Actuarial techniques are incorporated and
mobilized by a range of institutions, from police departments
to social service agencies to financial institutions. All these
institutions rely on evaluating events based on probabilities
and statistics and conceptions of risk that insurance has helped
make possible (Ewald, 1986).
p0150Risk-based principles drawn from insurance are increasingly
a template through which to govern other relationships in
society. There is at least one important difference, however,
between insurance institutions using risk-based principles and
noninsurance institutions using risk-based principles.
Insurance institutions gather, pool, transfer, and spread risk
and thereby eliminate or at least reduce the importance of
those day-to-day concerns of people who are exposed to
them. However, risks that are not subject to insurance
Insurance and the Law 5
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coverage, such as the examples I provided earlier, are not spread
and eliminated in this manner, and therefore have significant
consequences for the people exposed. A risk that occurs
beyond insurance, therefore, is experienced in a much
different manner than a risk that is insured. More recently,
public and private insurance institutions are placing a greater
emphasis on an individual’s responsibility to embrace risk
more directly. Scholars continue to engage in philosophical,
theoretical, and normative debates concerning what
distinguishes an insurable versus and uninsurable risk:
“Because of the crucial role of insurance institutions in
socializing risk and responsibility, studying risks beyond
insurance opens a window on the limits of social
responsibility and the role of ideas about individual
responsibility in the shaping of insurance institutions and
forms” (Baker and Simon, 2002: 12).
p0155 As this article highlights, insurance serves multiple func-
tions in society. The forms and functions of insurance and
conceptions of risk more broadly can have potentially positive
and negative effects in society. Setting aside normative argu-
ments concerning whether insurers’ rising role in society is
a good or bad thing, there is little doubt that insurance will
continue to be intertwined and connected with the law and
consequently impact society in multifaceted ways.
See also: Regulation and Governance: Law and Society; 86014;
14033; 71041; Legal Insurance; Markets and the Law; National
Health Care and Insurance Systems; 71034; 85019; 86111;
86116; 86054.
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